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Abstract
Background: Hospital governance is broadening its orientation from cost and production controls towards
‘improving performance on clinical outcomes’. Given this new focus one might assume that doctors are
drawn into hospital management across OECD countries. Hospital performance in terms of patient health,
quality of care and efficiency outcomes is supposed to benefit from their involvement. However, international
comparative evidence supporting this idea is limited. Just a few studies indicate that there may be a positive
relationship between medical doctors being part of hospital boards, and overall hospital performance. More
importantly, the assumed relationship between these so-called doctor managers and hospital performance has
remained a ‘black-box’ thus far. However, there is an increasing literature on the implementation of quality
management systems in hospitals and their relation with improved performance. It seems therefore fair to
assume that the relation between the involvement of doctors in hospital management and improved hospital
performance is partly mediated via quality management systems. The threefold aim of this paper is to 1) perform a
quick scan of the current situation with regard to doctor managers in hospital management in 19 OECD countries, 2)
explore the phenomenon of doctor managers in depth in 7 OECD countries, and 3) investigate whether
doctor involvement in hospital management is associated with more advanced implementation of quality
management systems.
Methods: This study draws both on a quick scan amongst country coordinators in OECD’s Health Care
Quality Indicator program, and on the DUQuE project which focused on the implementation of quality
management systems in European hospitals.
Results: This paper reports two main findings. First, medical doctors fulfil a broad scope of managerial roles
at departmental and hospital level but only partly accompanied by formal decision making responsibilities.
Second, doctor managers having more formal decision making responsibilities in strategic hospital
management areas is positively associated with the level of implementation of quality management systems.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that doctors are increasingly involved in hospital management in OECD
countries, and that this may lead to better implemented quality management systems, when doctors take up
managerial roles and are involved in strategic management decision making.
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Background
Hospitals are under increasing scrutiny to improve
their performance. This does not only include the
performance in terms of efficiency, but also, and in-
creasingly, the performance in terms of quality and
patient outcomes [1, 2]. Consequently, hospital gov-
ernance is broadening its orientation from ‘control’ of
costs and production towards ‘performance’ in terms
of clinical outcomes. Hospital governance can be
understood as a broad and ambiguous term. It essen-
tially refers to the complex patterns of hospital-
related decision-making at different levels shaping the
actual “governance structure” for hospitals. It should
be distinguished from hospital management which is
narrower focusing on the day-to-day operational man-
agement of staff and services inside the hospital
organization [2].
Against the backdrop of the so-called outcome-based
hospital governance, doctors are drawn into hospital
governance around the world [3, 4]. The argument is
twofold. First, hospitals would improve their perform-
ance successfully, if led by people who are the key
producers of clinical care. This seems common sense,
as one needs a deeper understanding of the primary
processes of patient care, i.e., professional expertise,
for being able to improve the quality of care and
patient outcomes for the better. The implementation
of Quality Management Systems is considered one of
the main mechanisms to realize performance im-
provement [5].
Second, hospital governance is notoriously strained
due to its dual organizational structure - that is the co-
existence of both managerial and professional decision
making structures, as initially recognized and depicted
in the concept of the ‘professional bureaucracy’ [6]. Later
the US sociologist Eliot Freidson (2001) theorized that
clinicians, being professionals, predominantly organize
their practices following the logic of professionalization,
while hospital managers follow the logic of management
science or bureaucracy [7]. As both logics are often at
odds with each other, tensional relationships between
clinicians and hospital managers are common. Drawing
doctors into hospital management would therefore ease
the tensional relationship, and ultimately enhance the
performance of the hospital [8–10]. More recent con-
ceptualizations go beyond this dualism by emphasizing
the intermingling of managerial and professional roles
that currently seems to take place, especially when it is
related to quality management [11, 12].
Studying the phenomenon of so called doctor man-
agers fits in with the broader research on hospital gov-
ernance. Research shows that there seems to be a
convergent trend towards more independent govern-
ance models for hospitals in many countries as the
traditional command-and-control model will no longer
be viable [2, 13]. Hospitals will need to be governed as
part of a network of outpatient and inpatient care pro-
viders that are concerned with patient responsiveness
and better attention to the role of professionals. How-
ever, the comparative research on the impact of these
newly emerging models is scattered and inconclusive.
There are still many aspects that are not well
understood.
Amongst others, few studies have investigated the
relationship between hospital governance and quality
performance. There are some studies reporting associ-
ations between quality performance and a range of
initiatives including strategic goal setting for quality
improvement, putting quality performance on the
agenda of board meetings, monitoring quality dash-
boards, and appointing a quality committee [14–17].
Furthermore, the engagement of CEOs in quality
management was associated with the success of qual-
ity improvement projects [18]. However, most studies
on hospital governance have been carried out in the
US, and the underlying mechanisms remain unclear.
Even more scarce is the research about the role of
doctor managers and their impact on hospital perform-
ance. Just one study found on the basis of a secondary
analysis of publicly available data of hospital trusts in
the UK that those hospitals headed up by a doctor per-
form better than those led by lay managers [19]. An-
other cross-sectional study reported strong associations
between the top-100 US hospitals media-generated
ranking of quality and the medical background of the
chief executive officer [20].
In conclusion, the processes through which doctor
managers may mediate better hospital performance in
terms of patient, quality and financial outcomes re-
mains a ‘black-box’ thus far. Research on the relation-
ship between doctor managers and quality of care is
scarce, and international comparative research in this
area is lacking.
Therefore, it was timely and relevant to provide a
quick scan of the current situation with regard to
doctor managers in the hospital systems of 19 OECD
countries. In addition, we explored in depth this
phenomenon as related to the implementation of
Quality Management Systems in 7 OECD countries
drawing upon the DUQuE project (“Deepening our
understanding of quality improvement in Europe”)
[21, 22]. Within this in depth study we explored the
hospital governance and organisational context, the
formal managerial roles doctor managers have taken
up in their respective hospitals and we tested the as-
sociation between the level of their involvement in
hospital management and the level of implementation
of Quality Management Systems.
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Methods
To address the research objectives, we combined empir-
ical data from: 1) a quick scan drawing upon a short
structured questionnaire amongst 19 country experts in
the OECD’s Health Care Quality Indicator program,
and 2) from a cross-sectional multilevel study, both
on doctors’ involvement in hospital management and
on the implementation of quality management systems, in
the 7 OECD countries included in the DUQuE study.
The impact of doctor managers in 7 OECD countries
For developing a quick overview of doctors’ involvement
in hospital governance decisions in 19 OECD countries,
we developed a short structured questionnaire. It was
designed in four parts covering the (i) medical doctors’
involvement in governance decisions, (ii) the involve-
ment of the governing board in clinical quality, (iii) use
of quality indicators and (iv) suggestions for further
country information sources.
The questionnaire was used to collect data through
face-to-face interviews with OECD country experts at-
tending the OECD Health Care Quality Indicators meet-
ing in Paris, November 2013. These country experts
were highly placed national public servants representing
their national Ministries of Health.
Out of all participating country experts, 19 of them
agreed to participate. Respondents were conveniently se-
lected on their availability, but also purposefully selected
to get all country experts from the seven countries
included in DUQuE study (i.e., Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey
[21, 22]). All approached experts agreed to
participate.
The data from the interviews were complemented with
the literature to map the hospital governance and organ-
isational context of doctor managers in the 7 OECD
countries included in the DUQuE study in more detail.
This was done against the comparative framework devel-
oped by Kirkpatrick et al. [23]. The framework distin-
guishes four key areas: strategic (governance), middle
management, the nature of authority structures and de-
velopment of nonclinical management roles [23].
Cross-sectional data from the Duque project
The DUQuE project encompassed a multi-method,
cross-sectional study design to collect quality-related
information from European hospitals between May
2011 and February 2012. Included countries repre-
sented a geographical reach of the EU and various
approaches to organizing health care. Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey
agreed to participate. These heath care systems pro-
vided a variation in the ratio between public and pri-
vate hospitals, the number of teaching hospitals and
hospital size. From each country, a random sample of
30 hospitals was recruited. The inclusion criteria were
size (>130 beds) and treatment typology (acute myo-
cardial infarction (AMI), hip fracture, stroke and de-
liveries) [22].
To address the main objective of studying the effect-
iveness of quality improvement systems in European
hospitals, the DUQuE project team conceptualized,
adapted and operationalized several constructs that
were considered to be relevant to the quality of hospital
care, including the doctors’ involvement in hospital
management. This was done to capture a factor that
could influence the uptake and implementation of qual-
ity improvement activities in hospitals.
Study population
In each participating hospital we sent questionnaires to
10 leading medical doctors. We defined a leading med-
ical doctor as one who has a formal or informal leading
role within the hospital. The identified leading medical
doctors could indicate to what extent they had a formal
management role and were involved in hospital manage-
ment decision-making. In addition, the quality manager
of each hospital was asked to fill in a questionnaire de-
scribing the level of implementation of their quality
management system.
Measures used
The formal management role was measured by asking
the respondents whether they held a formal manage-
ment role and at what level (departmental or hos-
pital). Answering categories to three items were 1 =
Yes; 2 = No. In addition, we used a validated measure
for professional involvement within hospitals [24].
This measure focused on the self-reported participa-
tion in hospital management decision-making by lead-
ing doctors and nurses. The professional involvement
was measured in various areas of hospital management as
perceived by leading medical doctors. Answering categor-
ies were: 1 = No involvement; 2 = Giving an opinion;
3 = Shared decision-making; 4 = Final decision-making
responsibility. For the purpose of this study, we only
used the self-reported formal management role and
the perceived participation of leading medical doctors
in hospital decision-making. The questionnaire is
available on request.
The extent to which a quality management system is
implemented, was measured by the Quality Management
System Index (QMSI). This measurement tool was de-
veloped based on previous research by the DUQUE team
and following a systematic review of the literature on
conceptual models and measurement instruments [25].
QMSI measures the implementation of nine dimensions
trough 46 items: quality policy documents, quality
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monitoring by the board, training of professionals,
formal protocols for infection control, formal proto-
cols for medication and patient handling, analysing
performance of care processes, analysing performance
of care professionals, analysing feedback patient expe-
riences and evaluate results. Quality managers were
asked to answer questions related to these dimen-
sions. The implementation of the management system
is expressed as an index (0–27), based on the extent
of implementation of QI activities. Thus, the maturity
index tells us something about how mature/well im-
plemented the activity is within the hospital. In other
words, a high score would mean that i) a wide scope
of QI dimensions is addressed in the QM system, and
ii) these dimensions are not only addressed at the
level of strategic planning, but are actually imple-
mented and their implementation is assessed (items
are phrased based on the PDCA cycle).
Statistical analyses
Descriptive statistics were calculated to describe hospital
characteristics (teaching status, ownership, and size) and
demographic characteristics of participating leading
medical doctors (gender, age, and number of years in
job). Descriptive statistics are also reported for the out-
come QMSI and main predictor (professional involve-
ment in hospital management) in the analysis.
We analysed the relationship between professional
involvement with the implementation of quality man-
agement as measured by QMSI. A multivariable linear
regression model with random intercept by country
was used to analyse the relationship between profes-
sional involvement (predictor) and the implementa-
tion of quality management systems as measured by
QMSI (outcome). A linear regression model was applied
to estimate the relationship between scalar predictor and
outcome variables. We used a multivariable model to be
able to adjust for hospital confounders. Hospital teaching
status, ownership type and number of beds were treated
as confounder in the model. Since we also expected that
country differences can influence the abovementioned re-
lationship, we included a random intercept for country in
order to account for clustering of hospitals within coun-
tries. To determine statistical differences, the level of sig-
nificance was set at 5 %. All statistical analyses were
carried out in STATA.
Results
Doctors’ involvement in hospital management in 19
OECD countries
Table 1 provides the overview of the involvement of
doctors in hospital governance within the 19 OECD
countries. According to the OECD country experts, in
18 out of 19 countries medical doctors are part of
the hospital top structure, and in some countries to-
gether with a ‘manager from another background, i.e.,
economics, health care administration, nursing, law or
epidemiology.
Fourteen country experts reported that the hospitals
in their countries have adopted a formalized structure
based on mutual responsibilities, working guidelines and
policies that regulates the relationship and interaction
between the medical doctors and governing board.
These formalized interactions are reported to exist since
the late 80s’ and countries have adopted them gradually
over time. The experts reported that medical doctors are
involved in hospital governance in 18 countries (all ex-
cept Germany). The types of tasks in which medical doc-
tors are involved create a mixed picture. In 9 of the
countries the involvement is clinically related limited to
medical activities while in another 8 countries the role is
broader including all other managerial activities (e.g.
budget holder, human resources etc.). Amongst the clin-
ically related activities, the main reported focus is related
to guideline development and quality indicators (e.g.
Denmark, Israel, Spain). The medical doctors involved
have the role to oversee the delivery and volume of ser-
vices, waiting times (Slovenia) and to take decisions on
hi-tech acquisitions (South Korea).
The role of the medical doctors in hospital governance
decisions is formalized through a set of working guide-
lines in all countries except England. It was reported that
in 8 countries the role is consultative, in 7 countries de-
cisional and in the remaining, the role is both consulta-
tive and decisional.
Doctor managers in 7 OECD countries
Sample characteristics
There were 188 hospitals participating in the Duque
study (Table 2). Most hospitals were public (n = 156,
82.9 %), and medium sized with 200 to 500 beds (N = 79,
42.0 %). Almost half of the hospitals had a teaching pro-
file (N = 81, 43.0 %). In 188 hospitals there were 1670
leading medical doctors who completed the question-
naire, yielding an overall response rate of 88 %. Ques-
tionnaire completeness was high; 1505 respondents
(90 %) responded to all questions in the survey.
Most of the respondents were male (N = 1151, 68.9).
Their average age was 49.3 (SD 8.3) years. All respon-
dents were experienced, as reflected in the 21.9 (SD 9.7)
years on average since they completed their professional
training. Most of the respondents were member of a
professional society (N = 1464, 87.6 %).
Hospital governance
Table 3 provides a more detailed description of the hos-
pital governance and organisation within the 7 OECD
countries included in the DUQuE study. The data fits in
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Table 1 The phenomenon of doctor managers in 19 OECD countries
Country MDs in Top
Management
Team
Formalized interaction
between MDs
and TM
Formalization
into force since
MDs involvement
in TM tasks
Type of tasks MDs role in
TM decisions
Belgium Medical doctors YES 1987 YES mostly advisory Consultative
Economists
Managers
Nurses
Jurist
Czech Republic Medical doctors YES 2012 YES all - most managers are MD Decisional
Managers
Denmark Medical doctors YES 1990 YES support the development of
clinical indicators & practice
guidelines; education; human
resources;
Decisional
Economists
Managers
Nurses
England Economists NO N/A YES depending on internal
processes and regulation;
nothing standardizedFinance
France Medical doctors YES - YES e.g. infection management Decisional
(in practice)
Managers Consultative
(in theory)
Germany Medical doctors YES - NO N/A Consultative
Economists
Managers
Academia - where
the case
Israel Medical doctors YES 2009 YES National Programme of
Quality Indicators
Consultative
Economists
Italy Medical doctors NO N/A YES only at a medical unit level Consultative
Managers
Luxemburg Medical doctors YES 1998 YES coordination of medical
interdepartmental activities
Consultative
Economists
Nurses
Poland Medical doctors YES 1998 YES advisory and decisional Decisional
Managers Consultative
Portugal Medical doctors YES many years
ago
YES e.g. infection control Decisional
Economists
Managers
Nurses Consultative
Legal
Slovenia Medical doctors NO N/A YES e.g. delivery of services, volume
of services, waiting times;
Consultative
Economists
Spain Medical doctors YES - depends
on the region
2006 YES local guidelines Decisional
Managers
Sweden Medical doctors NO - in most
regions
N/A YES e.g. setting Quality Indicators
and guidelines
Consultative
Managers
Turkey Medical doctors NO N/A YES all hospital management task Decisional
Economists
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with the bigger picture that hospital governance prac-
tices move away from governing hospitals through paral-
lel hierarchies, with doctors represented by a senior
medical committee, sometimes with powers to veto
management decisions. All 7 countries are changing or
have changed the hospital governance. The focus is now
on strong medical management roles on departmental
level and all doctors reporting through a single, unitary
chain of command to a clinical director who in turn is
accountable to the chief executive or general manager of
a hospital. Notwithstanding the convergent trend, the
hospital governance and organisation arrangements dif-
fer amongst the 7 OECD countries.
Formal management roles
A small proportion of our respondent sample (9.8 %)
held no formal management role (Table 4). More than
half of the respondents (51.7 %) held a formal manage-
ment role at the department level. The rest held formal
management roles at the hospital level only (5.3 %) or
both at the hospital and department levels (17.5 %).
When it comes to the professional involvement in
hospital management decision-making, the majority of
the respondents only gives their opinion. This did not
differ much across the four decision-making areas.
Only when it comes to the managing of medical prac-
tice, the respondents share decision-making responsi-
bility (mean 2.8; SD 0.7).
Professional involvement and quality management systems
Associational analysis between the professional in-
volvement measure and the quality management system
index (QMSI) showed a significant positive association be-
tween the professional involvement in strategic manage-
ment and the QMSI. This means that those hospitals
where leading medical doctors share decision-making or
have final decision making responsibility in strategic issues
have a higher score on QMSI (Table 5).
Discussion
We were able to conduct an international study on
the involvement of leading medical doctors in hospital
governance in OECD countries, most in depth in 7
European countries. The large sample of 1670 respon-
dents in 188 hospitals yielding a response rate of
88 % provides novel evidence in this research area
that is still in its infancy.
Hospitals are broadening their focus from steering on
efficiency, productivity and cost control towards steering
on improvement of outcomes in terms of quality and pa-
tient outcomes [1, 2]. Furthermore, indicative evidence
Table 1 The phenomenon of doctor managers in 19 OECD countries (Continued)
Japan Medical doctors YES 2000 YES CEO Decisional
Singapore Medical doctors YES 2009 YES almost all hospital
management task
Decisional
Managers
South Korea Medical doctors YES - only in
large hospitals
2000 YES e.g. most decisions on
hi-tech acquisitions and
quality assessment
Decisional
Managers - rarely
Canada Medical doctors YES 2003–2008 YES almost all hospital
management task
Consultative
Economists
Managers
Epidemiologists
Table 2 Characteristics of the DUQUE study sample
Characteristics of the hospitals N %
All Hospitals 188 (100)
Teaching Hospitals 81 (43.0)
Public Hospitals 156 (82.9)
Approximate number of beds in hospital N %
<200 18 (9.5)
200–500 79 (42.0)
501–1000 62 (32.9)
>1000 29 (15.4)
Characteristics of the leading doctorsa
Gender N %
Male 1151 (68.9)
Female 510 (30.5)
Gender missing 9 (0.5)
Age (years), Mean (SD) 49.3 (8.3)
Number of years since completion of
professional training, Mean (SD)
21.6 (9.9)
0–5 years, N (%) 106 (6.3)
6–10 years, N (%) 139 (8.3)
11–20 years, N (%) 483 (28.9)
21+ years, N (%) 914 (54.7)
Missing, N (%) 28 (1.6)
Member of professional society, N (%) 1464 (87.6)
aIncludes attending physicians and residents-in-training
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shows that involving doctors in hospital governance is posi-
tively associated with the performance of hospitals [19, 20].
The findings of this study confirm that involving of medical
doctors in hospital management is common practice in al-
most all of the 19 OECD countries on both departmental
(middle management) and hospital level. This finding is
quantitatively substantiated by our in depth study in 7
OECD countries showing that almost all leading medical
doctors have taken up formal management roles, mostly at
the departmental level, but also on hospital level or both.
Still, 1 out of 10 leading medical doctors in our study re-
ported not to hold any formal management role. Thus, be-
ing a leading medical doctors does not automatically go
along with a formal managerial position.
Moreover, the formalisation of managerial roles is not
automatically accompanied by final decision-making re-
sponsibility. On average most medical doctors are con-
sulted and asked to give their opinion. Thus, it seems
that doctors execute management tasks, but without
the mandate to really take the managerial decisions.
This is in line with the contextual data on the hospital
governance and organisation within these 7 countries
sketching an ambiguous role of leading medical doctors
in hospital management, which is also highlighted in
the literature [11, 12].
Furthermore, our findings indicate that leading
medical doctors actually having decision-making re-
sponsibility in strategic management issues matters. It
is associated with higher levels of implemented qual-
ity management systems. This finding supports the
hypothesis that involving medical doctors in hospital
management leads to better performing hospitals me-
diated through the implementation of quality systems.
Moreover, it sheds light on why drawing medical doc-
tors in management is associated with better hospital
performance [19]. In the larger Duque study a clear
relation was found between the implementation of de-
partmental quality strategies and clinical practice [26].
Hence a relation with the medical management roles
on departmental level is a fair assumption. Our find-
ing also suggest that the actual decision making re-
sponsibility in strategic management areas is critical
for the assumed relationship with hospital perform-
ance. Thus, a critical factor may not be the uptake of
managerial tasks by doctors in itself, but giving them
also the actual decision-making responsibility in stra-
tegic management areas.
Strengths and limitations of the study
This study has a number of limitations that need to be
highlighted. First, we cannot draw conclusions on caus-
ality due to the cross-sectional nature of both the quick
scan and the Duque study. Second, international re-
search on the involvement of medical doctors in hospital
governance needs to account for contextual differences
across countries. Hospital governance systems differ sig-
nificantly amongst OECD countries [2]. This also influ-
ences how medical doctors take up managerial roles and
Table 4 Doctors’ involvement in hospital management in 7 European countries
Having a formal management role N %
No formal management role 165 (9.8)
Formal management role at the department level only 864 (51.7)
Formal management role at the hospital level only 90 (5.3)
Formal management role at both the department and hospital level 293 (17.5)
Formal management role missing/unknown 258 (15.4)
Professional involvement in management Mean SD
“How would you describe your participation within the following decision-making areas?”
1 = No involvement, 2 = Giving an opinion, 3 = Shared decision making, 4 = Final decision making responsibility
Administration and budgeting 2.1 0.7
Managing medical practice 2.8 0.7
Strategic management 1.7 0.6
Managing nursing practice 1.8 0.6
Table 5 Regression coefficients for the association between
professional involvement in management (4 subscales) and
hospital quality management indices QMSI
QMSIa (mi)
b (SE)
Strategic management 3.86 (1.61)*
Administration and budgeting 1.37 (0.96)
Managing medical practice 2.57 (1.52)
Managing nursing practice 0.35 (1.12)
Professional involvement scale (total) 0.68 (0.34)*
aFor each of the 4 scales of professional involvement in management, we
estimated its association with QMSI using a multivariable linear regression
model with random intercept by country, adjusted for confounders at hospital
level (number of beds, ownership, teaching status)
*Significance p < 0.05
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how quality systems are implemented. For this reason,
we complemented the DUQuE study with a quick scan
yielding contextual data on doctor managers in 19
OECD countries. Within the DUQuE study, we tackled
this issue by specifically developing and validating an in-
strument that fitted our research objective [24]. Above
all, we were able to adjust for different country and hos-
pitals characteristics in ways that allowed us to address
competing explanations and plausible (non)causal asso-
ciations, while minimizing sources of bias [22]. A third
limitation is related to the sampling strategies employed.
The convenient sampling of country experts for the
quick scan may have led to some bias. Even so, the ran-
dom sampling of the countries, hospitals and medical
doctors for the Duque study may have led to selection
bias (e.g., self-selection by the hospitals and medical doc-
tors accepting to participate). Therefore, generalization
to participating countries and hospitals was limited.
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that in OECD countries medical
doctors are increasingly involved in hospital governance
on both departmental (middle management) and stra-
tegic hospital level. Most importantly, doctors involve-
ment is associated with better implemented quality
management systems, especially when doctors are
involved in strategic management decision making.
Hence increased focus on hospital performance seems
to go along with strong medical involvement in hos-
pital governance.
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